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In 1952 Gregory Bateson received a grant to 
study communication within the framework generated 
by Russell's "logical types." (Russell 1910) Bateson 
took Russell's concept of paradox and applied it to 
human communication in an attempt to understand 
the genesis of schizophrenia. It was Bateson's idea 
that language encodes many levels of message in 
and contextualizing the utterance. (Bateson, Haley 
1972) In his article, "The message this is play," 
Bateson outlines a theory of communication in which 
one communicative behavior is qualified or "framed" 
by a higher "metacommunicative" message, which has 
the effect of telling the hearer how to interpret 
the behavior. Thus, in its primitive form, a theory 
of frames evolved in which content messages could 
and must be qualified by 'meta messages' of the sort, 
'take this ironically' or 'sarcastically,' or 
'literally,' etc. Non verbal communication becomes, 
in this theory, a level of message that may be 
congruent with the content message or incongruent. 
Bateson gives an example where a mother of a poten-
tially schizophrenic child tells her daughter to, 
"come and hug mommy, to show mommy you love her," 
then when the daughter hugs the mother, the mother 
stiffens, clearly illustrating how levels of message 
may dissaffirm one another. In the above example 
of mother and daughter we may suppose that the verbal 
message, 'your hugging me = love' is paradoxical 
from the daughter's perspective, as her mother 
seems to be saying one thing, and denying what she is 
saying on another, non-verbal level. The child 
learns to systematically distort her perception of 
metacommunicative signals. (Bateson 1972) 
In Bateson's schema, this is the essence of 
schizophrenia, a systematic disjunction between levels 
of message. Thus schizophrenia is a communicational 
pathology. 
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In Bateson's theory, all communication involves 
'relationship-defining behavior' what people say 
verbally and non-verbally is framed by the existing 
relationship between them If no such relationship 
exists, before adequate communication can take place 
a relationship must first be defined between the 
participants Relationships are of two basic types 
in his schema Symmetrical and Complementary. A 
Complementary relationship is one where participants 
do not compete for dominance, their behaviors fit one 
another - one directs, the other is directed In a 
Symmetrical relationship the participants compete 
or vie for dominance If one member does something 
spectacular, the other member tries to do as well or 
better This is a competitive relationship where 
members take turns in being "boss" over time In a 
complementary relationship there is characteristically 
one boss over time 1 Relationship defining behavior, 
for example~ is the maJor function of greeting 
ceremonies Phatic communication, as a whole 
functions to define relationships rather than content 
Watzlawick, an associate of Bateson's in his research 
on schizophrenia, has hypothesized that in 'healthy 
relationships,' relationship defining behavior 
recedes in importance and content becomes more 
important 3 
relationships are only rarely defined deliberately 
or with full awareness. In fact, it seems that 
the more spontaneous and "healthy" a relationship 
the more the relationship aspect of communication 
recedes into the background Conversely, "sick" 
relationships are characterized by a constant 
struggle about the nature of the relationship 
with the content aspect of communication becoming 
less and less important .(Watzlawick et al 1952) 
I will suggest that cooperation may be defined as 
a principle by which both participants agree to a 
mutual definition of the relationship they are involved 
in, and to its limits This agreement may not be 
overtly discussed but may be the result of one, or 
both participant's not challenging the relationship-
defining maneuvers of the other Thus, I use 
cooperation to mean nonchallenging behavior 
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This paper is concerned with a class of utterances 
which are designed to control the hearer's behavior 
without appearing to do so. The speaker's strategy 
becomes one of extreme indirectness. It will be 
hypothesized that much of what is known as 'indirect 
speech' can be adequately explained in relational 
terms as the only viable way of directing from the 
bottom end of a complementary relationship without 
attempting to redefine the relationship as more 
symmetrical. (See note 1) First the examples, then 
the analysis. Functionally the following utterances 
have a similar effect on some hearer 
(1) Traffic's pretty heavy, huh? 
(2) The baby woke up three times last night. 
(3) Does the kid have a cold again? (mother to 
daughter) 
(4) Did you change the baby's diaper? 
( 5) Did you get a flat on the way home? 
What (1)-(5) have in common is that they all crit-
icize by implication. Witness the following dialogues 
in terms of the implication of criticism that obtains 
for the addressee. I have underscored the hearer's 
reaction to the implication of criticism 
( 1) A-1 
B-2 
Traffic's pretty heavy, huh 9 (slight sarcasm) 
I know. I should've been home sooner. I'm 
sorry. 
A-3 I wasn't blaming you. 






The baby woke up three times last night. 
You mean I should've gotten up too. I'm 
sorry. 
Oh no! What could you have done 9 He only 
wanted to nurse anyway. 
Did you change the baby's diaper 9 
Sure. Why 9 Do you think I don't pay any 
attention to him? 
Why'd you say that? I just wondered if you 
changed his diaper, that's all. 
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(4) A-10 Does the kid have a cold again9 (mother to 
daughter) 
B-11 I know I should be more careful I 
shouldn't take him out so much 
A-12 What do you mean, it's hard being a mother. 
The hearer in each dialogue answers A by speaking 
to the implication of blame or criticism The speaker 
then denies having intended this level of messag4 thus 
creating, in the hearer's perception, a paradox, he's 
being criticised (by implication) and he's not being 
criticised (speaker denies having intended criticism) 
Paradox, and not contradiction obtains, for the speaker 
is not negating something she said, but rather is 
denying an implication resulting from what she said, 
and how she said it The speaker is thus in the 
position of being able to imply critism and then deny 
having intended to do so since her intentions are not 
directly 11 knowable" by the hearer The speaker's 
strategy becomes one of Paradoxical communication 
she must imply something and deny that she is implying 
something on the basis of not having said what she 
implied Paradox is possible for the speaker invokes 
two communicative levels in her denial she denies 
implying 'x' on the basis of not having asserted 'x ' 
I suggest that the speaker's use of Paradoxical 
communication is motivated by two opposing forces 
They are (1) The need to criticize (or direct the 
addressee to change his behavior), and (2) the 
inability to direct the addressee to change his 
behavior because of being at the lower end of a 
complementary relationship Her use of Paradox is an 
attempt to direct without challenging the structure 
of the relationship in which their interaction takes 
place 
The speaker's success in getting B to accept the 
fact that he's being criticized (though A is denying 
this) depends upon B's cooperation with A's paradoxical 
messages B, then, cooperates with paradoxical com-
munication by not challenging it Not challenging this 
behavior amounts to legitimizing it within the limits 
of their relationship 
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The interactional system represented by A and 
B is highly resistant to change. The frame of 
complementarity imposes restrictions on both partici-
pants. Let's imagine that B decides he wants A to 
interact more symmetrically with him. This would 
involve A being more direct, so B decides to answer 
A on the literal-content level only, thereby frus-
trating A's attempt to communicate by implication. 
(l) A Traff'ic's pretty heavy, huh? (slight 
sarcasm) 
B Yeh, it's a bitch? (or) No. 
(2) A Does the kid have a cold again? (Mother to 
daughter) 
B Uh. huh. (or) No. 
By answering only the literal form of the ques-
tion, B is giving A "negative feedback" about her 
attempt to communicate indirectly. B can respond to 




The baby woke up three times last night. 
(slight sarcasm) 
Why"> (or) That's very interesting 
a b 
(slight sarcasm) 
In either of B's responses, a or b, his strategy, as 
in (1) and (2) is to not cooperate with the implied 
message. In a, B treats A's utterance as purely 
informational and 'angelically' asks f'or more detail. 
In b, B replies in kind, sarcastically. B is 
communicating to A in b that strategies of the sort 
A is employing are not viable ones within the frame-
work of their relationship. B, in both a, and b, is 
uncooperative within the framework of indirect 
communication 
The field of cybernetics suggests that the 
behavior of people in a relationship or behavioral 
system may be analyzed in terms of a self-correcting 
or cybernetic system Speaking about family members' 
interaction Haley says 
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It follows that people associating together 
during long periods of time will not put up 
with any and all kinds of behavior from each 
other, they will set limits upon one another. 
Insofar as family members set limits for one 
another, it is possible to describe their 
interaction in terms of the self-corrective 
processes in the total system The family 
members respond in an error-activated way 
when any individual exceeds a certain limit. 
This process of mutually responsive behavior 
defines the rules of the family system In 
this sense a family is a system which contains 
a governing process. However there is not Just 
a single governor for the system, each member 
functions as a governor of the other(s) and 
thus the system is maintained (Haley 1963) 
The idea of a 'self-correcting' relational 
system as a legitimate way to view linguistic behavior 






Traffic's pretty heavy, huh? 
I know. I should've ••• 
I wasn't blaming you 
Then why did you ask me at all? 
Well, I Just wanted to know if there was a lot 
of traffic How could I know? I was home all 
day with the kid (you know). 
B-4-a challenges A's right to communicate 
paradoxically But A-5-a answers B's challenge in 
a way that at once suggests criticism of B Thus, 
A denies having intended criticism in A-1-a, and 
when challenged in B-4-a once again implies criticism 
in A-5-a B can never 'trap' A into admitting that 
criticism was intended, for A can eternally Justify, 
or make relevant her utterance in other ways. A 
general principle emerges A hearer can never prove 
that an utterance is irrelevant The relevance of 
an utterance thus, depends upon knowing the intentions 
of the speaker, and it is impossible to "know" directly 
what some speaker intended in uttering 'x ' 
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A more concrete example of the impossibility 
of "knowing" speaker's intentions comes from Charles 
Pyle at the University of Michigan. 
Someone seems to be 'putting you down.' You ask 
him what he's doing, (i e. why he's talking to you 
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the way he is) and he replies that he's "Just playing." 
You then have the option of accepting his statement 
of his intentions as congruent with his "real" inten-
tions, or you can assume he's lying about his "real" 
intentions, and is in fact, not playing. In either 
case the hearer cannot prove directly what the 
speaker's "real" intentions are in uttering 'x,' for 
intent1onaJity lies within the speaker's mind 
In conclusion I suggest that the Batesonian 
framework sketched above is a useful way of talking 
about the teleology of 'indirect' speech forms I 
suggest, too, that "explaining" indirect speech 
must explain why a more indirect form may be used, 
and not merely map a surface form to an implied 
form as Gordon and Lakoff (1971) have done. I 
suggest that speaker A, in my examples, finds it 
impossible to be more 'direct' witho~t altering 
or maneuvering for a different definition of 
relationship. 
Many linguists have treated 'indirect speech' and 
'direct speech' as alternate forms having the same 
content. This view has subordinated the pragmatics 
of indirect speech usage and concentrated on the 
content or 'information' aspect of The 
theory of language usage presented in paper 
posits an equally important level of message to 
the utterance, that of 'relationship defining.' 
This latter view that direct forms are 
not substitutable indirect forms as different 
relationship parameters would then be entailed 
I believe that much rethinking is needed 
concerning the putative distinction between 'direct' 
and 'indirect' speech. Some of these same questions 
are addressed in Pyle's "The Function of Indirectness" 
(Pyle, forthcoming) 
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Let me summarize several of the points I have 
raised in this paper 
(1) Talkin involves both content and relationship 
defining behavior. Even in 'healthy relation-
ships this is so, for the relationship defining 
aspect of communication in such a case is a given, 
and not fought over ) 
(2) Relationship and content definitions frame each 
other (are metacommunicative to each other) 
(3) Indirect speech forms may be the only way someone 
at the bottom end of a complementary relationship 
can direc~, without altering the definition of 
relationship in which he/she is involved. 
(4) Indirect speech may feed paradoxical communication 
as in, "I'm implying criticism but I deny 
criticising you Such Paradoxical messages may 
serve to maintain a communicational system 
of a certain type 
(5) Cooperation is another way of talking about "posi-
tive feedback" to a particular communicative 
strategy used within a behavioral system The 
lack of cooperation, or "negative feedback," 
then defines the limits or range of that 
particular system 
(6) A hearer can never prove that an utterance is 
irrelevant, for relevance is tied to speaker's 
intentions, which are not directly "knowable 11 5 
The usefulness of the Batesonian framework to 
linguistic research is yet to be adequately proJected 
There are cases such as levels of pronoun usage in 
S E Asia, nicknames vs proper names in the U S , 
and honorifics in Japanese (to name three examples) 
where relative intimacy or distance of relationship 
is obligatorilly marked in the grammar Such examples 
are well known In English we might view the "got 
passive" with the reflexive pronoun as a case where 
English is developing a way of formally indicating 
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metacomplementary relationships, as "Jane got herself 
kicked" indicates that Jane was responsible for 
someone doing 'x' to her.6 It seems, too, that in 
English the active voice may be used in highly 
personal discourse where the passive voice cannot, 
so we get a paradigm of inappropriateness like the 
following 
I am {loved J ~~~u } you re 1 k  b herhe is i e Y him 
They are comforted us 
them 
A paper I'm working on now suggests that the use of 
generic statements may, at times, be governed by 
speaker's intentions to intimate, to a second person, 
a closer relationship with some 3rd person, than 
actually is the case. This research suggests that 
a discussion of generic usage must include the 
information that a speaker, in using a generic form, 
implies that he/she knows the subject well enough 
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to be able to make such generalizations about him. 
Overall length of a monologue in a discourse suggests 
relationship defining behavior. Witness Hamlet's 
objection to Laertes' pompous and flowery oration over 
the grave of his sister Ophelia. 
" ••• what is he whose grief bears such an 
emphasis, whose phrase of sorrow conJures 
the wandering stars and makes them stand like 
wonder wounded hearers ••• " (Hamlet, Act V Scene 1) 
Hamlet makes note of Laertes' insincerity as being a 
function of lengthy discourse. The pervasiveness of 
relationship defining behavior in language is yet 
to be adequately handled in linguistics. I hope 
that many more linguists will recognize the necessity 
of future research in this area. 
I wish to express my appreciation to Charles Pyle, 
Alton Becker, Gail Dreyfuss, and Vern Carroll, all 
fine scholars, for their comments, and suggestions. 
All errors and shortcomings are, of course, my own. 
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NOTES 
1 The schema as I present it here is actually 
simplified. Bateson sets up a third category of 
relationship which occurs when one directs the other 
to direct. This he terms, "meta-complementary," 
which is a complementary relationship at a higher 
level 
2Albert Schefflin in his book Body Language and 
Social Order has hypothesized that even before verbal 
verbal interaction takes place two people exchange 
relationship defining signals kinesically They map 
map out territorial parameters before uttering a 
syllable Relationship defining verbal behavior in 
this structure, is redundant (information) to what 
was first mapped out non-verbally. 
3Although I agree in general with Watzlawicks' 
statement I would qualify his strong version in that 
unsettled relationships may further degenerate if no 
attempt is made by the participants to talk about 
the:ir relationship Such talk may actually amelio-
rate the relationship 
4Note that paradox is here a product of at least 
A1B1A2, that is, A1 must first imply 'x' to which B1 responds The A2 must deny 'x' as having been 
intended for paradox to obtain Paradox is not 
the result of ambiguity in A's intentions would be 
satisfied when A answered that 'x' was not intended, 
Paradox can only obtain for B if 'x' is perceived by 
Bas having been clearly intendedJthat is unambiguously 
intended Only in this case is A's later denial of 
intending 'x' seen as paradoxical. 
5rn Pyle's example of B questioning A's intent, 
A's response, "Just playing," must also be inter-
preted by B as to intention For example, A might be 
trying to get B to believe that he (A) is 'playing' 
where in fact he is not. This sort of Judgement is 
once again B's to make, and again he is in the position 
of not "knowing" with what intention A has uttered 
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"just playing." The regression as to "real intention" 
is, from B's point of view, potentially infinite. 
6The MetaComplementarity of the "got passive" 
with reflexive was suggested by c. Pyle. 
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